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Ideologies that legitimise status hierarchies are associated with increased wellbeing. 
However, which ideologies have ‘palliative effects’, why they have these effects, and 
whether these effects extend to low-status groups remain unresolved issues. The 
present study aimed to address these issues by testing the effects of the ideology of 
Symbolic Prejudice on wellbeing among low- and high-status ethnic groups (4,519 
Europeans and 1,091 Māori) nested within 1,437 regions in New Zealand. Results 
showed that Symbolic Prejudice predicted increased wellbeing for both groups, but 
that this relationship was stronger for those living in highly unequal neighbourhoods. 
This suggests that it is precisely those who have the strongest need to justify 














The sigh of the oppressed: The palliative effects of ideology are stronger for 
people living in highly unequal neighbourhoods 
 
“Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it 
is the spirit of spiritless conditions.”  
 — Karl Marx. 
 
Marx’s (1844) aphorism about Religion being “the opium of the people” is 
probably the most famous articulation of the idea that belief can be palliative. There is 
now evidence that not just religious belief, but many kinds of belief systems – or 
ideologies – are positively related to psychological wellbeing (e.g. Conservatism, 
Meritocracy, Benevolent Sexism; McCoy, Wellman, Cosley, Saslow, & Epel, 2013; 
Jost, Wakslak, & Tyler, 2008; Napier & Jost, 2008; Napier, Thorisdottir & Jost, 2010; 
Osborne & Sibley, 2013). Consistent with Marx’s reasoning, System Justification 
Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994) proposes that these ideologies are palliative because 
they help people cope with the “spiritless conditions” in which they find themselves 
(Napier & Jost, 2008). Specifically, they help people legitimise the inequality under 
which they suffer.  
However, the burgeoning literature on the palliative effects of ideology raises 
some important questions that remain unresolved. First, the research to date has 
focussed on only a small subset of the many ideologies that can function to legitimise 
inequality (see Jost & Hunyady, 2005), leaving scope for further exploration of which 
ideologies have palliative effects. Second, there is disagreement about the underlying 
psychological mechanisms giving rise to these effects. While System Justification 
Theory suggests that palliative effects reflect the function that ideology serves for 
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legitimising inequality, several recent studies have challenged this interpretation (e.g. 
Schlenker, Chambers, & Le, 2012; Jetten, Haslam & Barlow, 2013). Third, it is 
unclear whether the palliative benefits of legitimising ideologies accrue equally to the 
victims and beneficiaries of inequality. There are reasons to expect either that these 
effects will be weaker among members of disadvantaged groups (e.g., Jost & 
Thompson, 2000; Rankin, Jost & Wakslak, 2009), or that they might be even stronger 
among these groups (see Laurin, Fitzsimmons & Kay, 2011; McCoy et al., 2013).  
Here, we aim to shed light on these questions by examining the link between 
ideology and wellbeing in a large, stratified national sample of high-and low-status 
groups (4,519 Europeans and 1,091 Māori, nested within 1437 neighbourhoods in 
New Zealand). More specifically, we test the palliative effects of an ideology that 
functions to legitimise inequality but has not yet been explored in the literature on this 
topic: Symbolic Prejudice. We also present a crucial test of inequality-legitimation 
account of palliative effects. If the reason why certain ideologies are positively 
associated with wellbeing is that they help people cope with inequality, then this 
association should be stronger for those living in more unequal contexts. Finally, we 
model a three-way, cross-level interaction which tests whether the strength of the 
palliative effects of ideology in more versus less equal conditions also differs based 
on whether people belong to a high- or low-status group.  
The Effects of Inequality 
Inequality between individuals and groups is both a historical feature of 
human societies and a contemporary reality (Piketty, 2014; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; 
Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). It is, however, an uncomfortable reality. Wilkinson and 
Pickett’s (2009) ground-breaking analysis showed that people who live in societies 
characterised by large disparities in wealth and income fare worse on a wide range of 
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social and psychological indicators compared to people in more equal societies. For 
example, in Western countries with high levels of inequality, people report lower 
levels of happiness and social trust (e.g. Delhey & Dragolov 2014; Fahey & Smyth 
2004; Layte 2011). Even within nations, people who live in more unequal areas (e.g. 
regions or neighbourhoods) report lower wellbeing and self-esteem than those in less 
unequal areas, adjusting for personal income (e.g. Alesina, Di Tella, & MacCullough, 
2004; Osborne, Sibley & Sengupta, 2015).  
Research exploring why inequality is associated with these negative outcomes 
is still in its infancy. However, the most empirically validated explanation in the 
extant literature is that inequality conflicts with fundamental human concerns for 
fairness and justice (see Schneider, 2015). As early as 12 months, infants show a clear 
preference for the fair distribution of resources (Geraci & Surian, 2011; Sloane, 
Baillargeon, & Premack, 2012), and this preference continues into adulthood 
(Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Norton & Ariely, 2011; Smith & Tyler, 1996). 
Large empirical literatures on System Justification Theory (SJT; Jost & Banaji, 1994) 
and the Just World Hypothesis (JWH; Lerner, 1980) have shown that people are 
generally motivated to perceive their social world as fair (Liviatan & Jost, 2014; Jost 
et al., 2004; van de Bos & Lind, 2002).  
When the motive to view society as fair is left unfulfilled by people’s social 
reality, they react negatively. Experiments by game theorists suggest that negative 
reactions to violations of fairness are a human universal (Fehr & Rockenbach, 2003; 
Henrich, 2000; Kahneman et al., 1986). At the societal level, Oishi, Kesebir and 
Diener (2011) found that Americans reported lower average happiness during years 
when inequality was higher, and that this effect was mediated by perceptions of 
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unfairness. These findings indicate that one reason that inequality is uncomfortable is 
because it leads people to question the fairness of the system under which they live.  
The Palliative Function of Ideology 
System Justification Theory proposes that one way people cope with the 
discomfort induced by inequality is to endorse ideologies – shared sets of beliefs, 
norms and prescriptions for making sense of one’s sociopolitical context – that make 
unequal social structures seem fair (Jost et al., 2008; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; 
Jost & Hunyady, 2005). The main hypothesis derived from this proposition is that 
ideologies that legitimise inequality will be positively associated with wellbeing.  
One such ideology that has received considerable empirical attention is 
generalised Conservatism, with numerous studies showing that conservatives are 
happier than liberals (Napier & Jost, 2008; Schlenker et al., 2012; see Onraet, Van 
Hiel, & Dhont, 2013 for a meta-analytic review). A system-justification account of 
this finding is that conservatives are better able to legitimise the inequality in their 
societies (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski & Sulloway, 2003; Napier & Jost, 2008). However, 
other researchers have questioned this interpretation, arguing that Conservatism is 
merely correlated with other factors that predict positive psychological adjustment 
(e.g. socioeconomic status, religiosity, moral clarity and optimism; Jetten et al., 2013; 
Schlenker et al., 2012). 
From a system-justification perspective, Conservatism is considered a 
legitimising ideology because it reflects support for an inherently unequal status quo 
(Napier & Jost, 2008). However, we argue that much of the uncertainty and 
disagreement over how to interpret the effects of Conservatism on wellbeing stems 
from the fact that this ideology is too broad to speak directly to the legitimizing 
function of people’s beliefs. For example, in addition to indexing support for unequal 
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systems, Conservatism also indexes other types of ideological positions that do not 
directly relate to the legitimation of inequality (e.g. support for authority and tradition, 
resistance to change; Duckitt, 2001; Jost et al., 2003). Therefore, a better test of the 
inequality-legitimation explanation for palliative effects would be whether ideologies 
with content that is more specific to legitimising inequality also show positive 
associations with wellbeing.  
Different Types of Legitimising Ideologies 
 One way of making inequality seem fair is to frame the victims of inequality 
as deserving of their disadvantage. There are several ideologies that serve this 
function. For example, the Belief in a Just World (BJW; Lerner, 1980) proposes that 
world is organised in such a way that people get what they deserve and deserve what 
they get; the Protestant Work Ethic (PWE; Furnham, 1982) proposes that success is 
merely the result of hard work; and Meritocracy (McCoy & Major, 2007) proposes 
that people’s outcomes are determined by their individual merit. Holding these types 
of beliefs allows people to derogate the victims of inequality as not being deserving 
enough, hard-working enough, or meritorious enough to have reaped better 
socioeconomic outcomes (see Hafer & Chroma, 2009; Quinn & Crocker, 1999; 
McCoy & Major, 2007). Thus, inequality can be explained as resulting from 
legitimate differences between individuals (e.g. differences in deservingness, work 
ethic, or merit), rather than from unfair social structures (see Major, 1994). Consistent 
with the inequality-legitimation account of palliative effects, all of these ideologies 
have been shown to relate positively to wellbeing (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon & Sullivan, 
2003; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; McCoy et al., 2013; O’Brien & Major, 2005; van der 
Toorn, Berricks & Jost, 2010). 
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 Derogating the victims of systemic disadvantage is not the only way to make 
societal inequalities seem fair. Ideologies that ascribe complementary positive and 
negative traits to low-status groups can make it seem like there is balance in society – 
people might be disadvantaged, but it is not “all bad” (Jost, Kay & Young, 2005). One 
such ideology is Benevolent Sexism (BS), which legitimises gender inequality by 
stereotyping women as “weak but wonderful” (Glick & Fiske, 2001). Again, 
consistent with the inequality-legitimation account of palliative effects, BS has been 
shown to predict greater life satisfaction among both men and women in 32 countries 
(Napier, Thorisdottir & Jost, 2010). Crucially, recent research suggests that these 
palliative effects of BS are mediated by increased perceptions that society is fair and 
just (Connelly & Heesacker, 2011; Hammond & Sibley, 2011).  
 Finally, more general ideologies that frame society as being fair despite 
existing inequalities (i.e., diffuse System Justification; Kay & Jost, 2003) or that 
frame inequality as being normative and desirable (i.e., Social Dominance 
Orientation; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) have also been shown to have palliative effects 
(e.g., Rankin et al., 2009; Wakslak, Jost, Tyler & Chen, 2007). Taken together, the 
fact that all of these ideologies –with content more specific to legitimising inequality 
than generalised Conservatism– show positive associations with wellbeing, suggests 
that the palliative function of ideology lies in its ability to help people cope with the 
sense of unfairness that is triggered by living in an unequal society.  
The Present Study 
The present study aims to extend the literature reviewed above by testing the 
palliative effects of another legitimising ideology that has not yet been explored in 
terms of its association with wellbeing – i.e., Symbolic Prejudice (Kinder & Sears, 
1981). Symbolic Prejudice indexes the belief that disadvantaged groups should not 
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receive any systematic compensation for their poorer social outcomes (e.g., in the 
form of affirmative action; see Sears & Henry, 2003). This ideology has been chosen 
because it is the logical conclusion of applying victim-blaming beliefs about the 
deservingness of individuals (e.g. Meritocracy, PWE) to the deservingness of groups. 
A corollary of the belief that inequality is the result of fair processes whereby more 
deserving individuals reap greater societal rewards is that disadvantaged groups have 
poorer outcomes because the individuals belonging to these groups are less deserving 
(see Peterson, 2015). Indeed, there is considerable empirical evidence that a core 
component of Symbolic Prejudice is the belief that individuals belonging 
disadvantaged groups (e.g. Black Americans) possess traits that make them 
undeserving (e.g. laziness/incompetence; see Sears & Henry, 2005 for a review).   
Our primary argument is that if ideologies about individuals such as 
Meritocracy, PWE and JWB have palliative effects because they legitimise inequality 
as arising from fair processes, then an ideology about groups such as Symbolic 
Prejudice that relies on the same logic of legitimation (i.e., that the victims of 
inequality are responsible for their own disadvantage) should also have similar 
palliative effects. If this were to be the case, then it would add further support to the 
notion that the palliative function of ideology lies in its ability to frame existing 
inequality in society as being fair and just.  
Apart from showing that ideologies with content specific to the legitimation of 
inequality have palliative effects, a crucial test of the inequality-legitimation account 
of these effects would be whether they are more pronounced among those living in 
highly unequal conditions. The inequality people see around them should lead them to 
experience a stronger sense of unfairness about the system under which they live than 
those living in more equal conditions (e.g. Oishi et al., 2011). Therefore they would 
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have the most to gain, psychologically, from belief systems that help them to frame 
this inequality as being fair. Here, we will test this idea directly for the first time by 
analysing differences in the strength of palliative effects among people living in more 
versus less equal neighbourhoods. 
Finally, the present study also aims to address a highly controversial and 
unresolved question about the palliative effects of ideology – i.e., the extent to which 
these effects will be observed among members of disadvantaged groups. The fact that 
advantaged-group members accrue the palliative benefits of legitimising ideologies is 
understandable because their motive to maintain their group’s position aligns with 
their motive to perceive the social world as fair (Jost, Burgess & Mosso, 2001). Thus, 
endorsing ideologies that frame inequality as fair allows dominant group members to 
continue reaping the benefits of being atop the social hierarchy, while simultaneously 
avoiding the discomfort caused by the unfairness inherent in that hierarchy (Wakslak 
et al., 2007). However, whether subordinate groups derive psychological benefits 
from beliefs that legitimise their own disadvantage is less clear, because the interests 
of these groups are not served by providing ideological support to unequal systems. 
 Indeed, this conflict between their self- and group-interests of the one hand, 
and their need to legitimise the inequality they are exposed to on the other, can have 
negative psychological consequences for members of disadvantaged groups. For 
example, Jost and Burgess (2000) found that members of low-status groups held more 
ambivalent attitudes towards their own group, and that this ambivalence increased as 
a function of their need to legitimise inequality. More directly, Jost and Thompson 
(2000) showed that while members of advantaged groups who subscribed to the 
legitimising ideology of SDO reported higher self-esteem and lower levels of 
depression, members of disadvantaged groups who subscribed to this same ideology 
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reported lower self-esteem and higher depression. Further, Rankin et al. (2009) 
showed that while framing the American system as being fair and just had palliative 
effects for European Americans, these effects were weaker and sometimes in the 
opposite direction among African Americans. These findings imply that the 
disadvantaged might not reap the same palliative benefits from legitimising ideologies 
as the advantaged do.  
 Nevertheless, there are several studies that find palliative effects even among 
low-status groups (Hammond & Sibley, 2011; Jost et al., 2003; McCoy et al., 2013; 
Napier et al., 2010; Obrien & Major, 2005). What is more, there are reasons to expect 
that these palliative effects might sometimes be even stronger among such groups. To 
understand why this might be the case, it is necessary to consider the different 
functions legitimising ideologies serve depending on whether one is a victim or a 
beneficiary of inequality.  
The primary discomfort-inducing implication of inequality for the 
beneficiaries of inequality (i.e., high-status groups) is that they have potentially 
gained an unfair advantage over others (Laurin, Fitzsimmons & Kay, 2011; Jost, et 
al., 2008). Therefore, the palliative function of legitimising ideologies for members of 
these groups lies primarily in their ability to reduce the aversive affective 
consequences of having accrued this kind of unfair advantage. Accordingly, Wakslak 
et al. (2007) showed that the relationship between ideology and wellbeing among the 
advantaged was mediated by reduced moral outrage and guilt. 
However, for members of low-status groups, the problem of inequality is more 
personal. These are the people who are disproportionately more likely to have had 
their own outcomes affected negatively by social stratification. For them, inequality 
implies an unfair disadvantage faced by themselves and their group.  Acknowledging 
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this implication can reduce the degree to which members of low-status groups feel 
like they have control over their own outcomes (Laurin et al., 2011). If people do not 
feel in control of their outcomes, they cannot plan for the future with confidence 
(Feather, 1982; Wigfield & Eccles, 1992), and thus, cannot enact strategies to 
improve their condition. Therefore, the primary palliative benefit of legitimising 
ideologies for low-status groups should lie in their ability to provide the sense of 
control necessary to engage in long-term goal pursuit. 
Consistent with this reasoning, Laurin et al. (2011) found, across five studies, 
that the legitimising ideology of Meritocracy predicted an increased commitment to 
long-term goals among members of low-status groups, but not among members of 
high-status groups. They also found that the reason these beliefs increased goal-
commitment among the disadvantaged was that they reduced expectations of being 
treated unfairly. In another study, McCoy et al. (2013) showed that the palliative 
benefits of Meritocracy for low-status groups were fully explained by increased 
perceptions of personal control. 
These findings suggest that legitimising ideologies serve a self-regulatory 
function for the disadvantaged that they do not serve for the advantaged. In addition 
to making people feel less morally outraged by inequality (e.g. Wakslak et al., 2007) 
these ideologies have the potential to help the disadvantaged feel a greater sense of 
personal control over their own outcomes (Laurin et al., 2011). Thus, the palliative 
effects of legitimising ideologies might in fact be stronger for disadvantaged relative 
to advantaged individuals. Given the paucity of empirical data comparing the strength 
of palliative effects between advantaged and disadvantaged groups, along with 
theoretical reasoning that seems to support a pattern in which these effects are either 
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stronger or weaker among the latter, we leave this an open question and test the 
interaction between group status and ideology predicting wellbeing.  
We additionally test a three-way interaction between inequality, ideology and 
group-status. This is because while inequality might indeed trigger concerns over 
fairness for both high- and low-status groups, the preceding analysis suggests that it 
might trigger an additional concern among low-status groups that they do not have 
personal control over their own outcomes in the unequal system. Thus, the enhanced 
palliative potential of legitimising ideologies for low-status groups might be 
especially pronounced under conditions of high inequality. On the other hand, in more 
equal conditions the disadvantaged might lose this particular psychological incentive 
to legitimise the very systems that disadvantage them (i.e., the incentive to gain a 
sense of personal control over their outcomes), and for them, the psychological costs 
of legitimation might begin to outweigh the benefits (e.g., see Jost & Thompson, 
2000). In this scenario, the difference between the strengths of palliative effects in 
more versus less equal conditions would be greater among disadvantaged groups than 
advantaged groups.  
The groups in the present analysis are European New Zealanders (i.e., the 
ethnic-majority group) and Māori (i.e., the indigenous peoples of New Zealand), 
drawn from a large, stratified, national sample of advantaged and disadvantaged 
groups in New Zealand (i.e. The New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study; NZAVS). 
The colonial history of New Zealand has left contemporary Māori at a severe 
socioeconomic disadvantage relative to their European counterparts (King, 2007; 
Walker, 1990). For example, Māori suffer higher mortality, incarceration and 
unemployment rates, have lower median incomes and report lower wellbeing 
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compared to Europeans (The Social Report, 2010; Ajwani, Blakely, Robson, Tobias, 
& Bonne, 2003). Thus, Māori are unquestionably a low-status group in New Zealand.  
 In addition to having large samples of both Europeans and Māori (N = 4,519 
and 1,091, respectively), our dataset includes information about the objective levels of 
income inequality across 1,437 regions of the country. The richness of these data 
provide us with an unprecedented opportunity to model how the level of inequality in 
a people’s immediate context interacts with their group-status and ideological beliefs 
to predict wellbeing.  
Hypotheses 
To summarise our analysis thus far, inequality has negative consequences for 
people’s wellbeing in large part because it conflicts with a general motive for fairness 
(e.g., Oishi et al., 2011). Based on this we predict: 
H1: There will be a negative relationship between the levels of inequality in 
people’s immediate context and their levels of subjective wellbeing.  
Second, the literature on the palliative effects of ideology suggests that the 
discomfort produced by inequality can be reduced by subscribing to ideologies that 
legitimise it by framing the victims of inequality as being responsible for their own 
outcomes (e.g. McCoy et al., 2013). Therefore, we predict: 
H2: There will be a positive relationship between the degree to which people 
subscribe to the legitimising ideology of Symbolic Prejudice and their subjective 
wellbeing. 
Third, if the palliative effects of ideology reflect the function that ideology 
serves to help people cope with the inequality then they should be stronger for people 
living in more unequal conditions. Based on this, we predict: 
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H3: The positive relationship between Symbolic Prejudice and subjective 
wellbeing will be stronger in neighbourhoods with a higher inequality compared to 
neighbourhoods with lower inequality.  
Fourth, given the lack of clear indication about whether the palliative effects 
of ideology will be stronger, weaker, or similar across groups of different status, we 
test the interaction between ethnicity and Symbolic Prejudice predicting subjective 
wellbeing. Finally, we test whether the difference between the palliative effects of 
ideology in more versus less equal contexts is smaller or larger among members of a 
disadvantaged group (i.e. Māori) by modelling a three-way interaction between 
neighbourhood-level inequality, Symbolic Prejudice and ethnicity.  
   
Method 
Sampling Procedure 
Data for the present analyses are drawn from the New Zealand Attitudes and 
Values Study (NZAVS)1. The first wave of the NZAVS (collected in 2009) contained 
responses from 6518 participants randomly sampled from the 2009 New Zealand 
electoral roll. The electoral roll is publicly available for scientific research and, in 
2009, contained 2,986,546 registered voters. This represented all citizens over 18 
years of age who were eligible to vote (regardless of whether they chose to vote), 
barring people who had their contact details removed due to specific case-by-case 
concerns about privacy. In sum, postal questionnaires were sent to 40,500 registered 
voters (i.e., roughly 1.36% of all registered voters in New Zealand). The overall 
response rate (adjusting for the address accuracy of the electoral roll and including 
anonymous responses) was 16.6%. 
Census Area Units 
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The New Zealand census provides rich information about each area 
unit/neighbourhood of the country and makes these data available for research 
purposes. The smallest of these area units are “meshblocks”. As noted above, 
meshblocks make up larger census area units (which were our focus in this paper). 
The geographical size of these census area units differs depending on population 
density, but each unit tends to cover a region containing a median of 2097 residents 
(M = 2,253, SD = 1,587, range = 3-9,027). These area units are thus roughly the size 
of small neighbourhoods (in terms of population). Although they do not represent 
formal geographic neighbourhoods, they provide a novel source of information about 
the population characteristics of the immediate 2,000-odd people living in each 
participant’s region of residence.  
Participants 
Of the entire sample, only participants who identified as New Zealand 
European or Māori—and who provided complete data for our variables of interest—
were included in our analysis. This subsample contained responses from 5,592 
participants (i.e., 85.8% of the overall sample). Our analysis of Europeans was based 
on 4,504 participants nested within 1,337 census area units (3.37 per unit), whereas 
our analysis of Māori was based on 1,088 participants nested within 690 area units 
(1.58 per unit). Collapsing across Māori and non-Māori respondents, our sample 
resided in 1,437 distinct census area units. 
Procedure for Calculating Neighbourhood Inequality 
We calculated regional Gini coefficients for the net 1,437 census area units in 
New Zealand in which our participants resided. Thus, this analysis spanned the vast 
majority of all area units in New Zealand. The rare cases where there were missing 
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Gini coefficients for area units (n = 372) from our sample occurred because some 
units in rural areas have a very small number of (or, in some cases, no) residents.  
We used data from the 2006 New Zealand census to determine the number of 
people in each census area unit whose household income fell within each of the 
following household income bands provided by Statistics New Zealand: (a) less than 
$5,000, (b) $5,001-$10,000, (c) $10,001-$20,000, (d) $20,001-$30,000, (e) $30,001-
$50,000, and (f) $50,001 and above. Because the census only provides information on 
broad income bands, we took the lower value within each band and treated these 
points as known values when interpolating a Lorenz curve, as outlined in Equation 1.0 
(see Chaudhary, 2009, p. 126): 
 
 !" = 1 −	∑ ()*+*," −	)*-")(/* +	/*-") (1.0) 
 
Where, Xk is the cumulated proportion of the population variable, for k = 0,...,n, 
with X0 = 0, Xn = 1; and Yk is the cumulated proportion of the income variable, for k = 
0,...,n, with Y0 = 0, Yn = 1. 
 
This formula provides an approximate estimate of income inequality, as we do 
not employ advanced techniques such as approximating a quadratic function or other 
smoothing procedures. Also, because income values above $50,001 were rounded 
down to $50,001, our estimate systematically underestimates the actual level of 
inequality in each region. Despite these limitations, our Gini estimate offers a 
reasonable Lorenz curve approximation of inequality given the available data from 
the census on household income for each area unit of the country. As with a standard 
Gini coefficient calculated at the level of the nation, scores on our Gini estimate could 
range from 0 (complete equality) to 1 (complete inequality). Thus, higher scores 
reflect greater levels of regional-level inequality. Within our study, Gini values 
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ranged from .33 to .73 (M = .47, SD = .05). We additionally included the population 
size of each census area unit as a covariate in our model due to the high degree of 
variation in the number of people in each unit (Range: 3-9,027).  
Questionnaire Measures  
 Ethnicity was measured using the standard wording and coding system 
employed by the New Zealand census: “Which ethnic group do you belong to? (mark 
the space or spaces which apply to you)”. Symbolic Prejudice was measured using the 
following three items drawn from a longer, New Zealand-specific scale developed by 
Sibley and Wilson (2007): (a) “we are all New Zealanders and the law should not 
make provision for minority groups because of their ethnicity”, (b) “true equality can 
be achieved only once we recognise that some ethnic groups are currently more 
disadvantaged than others and require additional assistance from the government” 
(reverse-scored), and (c) “we are all one nation and we should all be treated the same. 
No one should be entitled to anything more than the rest of us simply because they 
belong to one particular ethnic group.” Each item was rated on a 7-point scale with 
anchors at 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly agree) and averaged to form a 
measure of meritocratic beliefs (α = .69). Personal wellbeing was measured using 
ratings of satisfaction on a 0-10 scale (0 – completely dissatisfied; 10 – completely 
satisfied) for the following four items: “Your health”; “Your personal relationships”; 
“Your standard of living”; “Your future security” (α = .73). We also adjusted for the 
effects of household income, to show that our predicted pattern reflected the effects of 
inequality and group-status, rather than personal financial status. Finally, other 
demographic covariates, specifically, age, gender (women = 0, men = 1) and 
education (none = -2, some high school = -1, diploma/certificate = 0, undergraduate 
= 1, postgraduate = 2) were also included as covariates in the model at the within 
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level, while population size of the area units was included as a covariate at the 
between level.  
 
Results 
We constructed a multilevel model examining the relationship between 
Symbolic Prejudice and personal wellbeing moderated by ethnicity, adjusting for the 
logarithm of household income, gender, age, education (at the within-level) and the 
population size of census area units (at the between-level). We modelled the intercept 
and slope for Symbolic Prejudice as random effects, thus allowing them to vary 
across census area units. Symbolic Prejudice, ethnicity, the logarithm of household 
income, gender, age and education were centred at their respective group means. We 
included regional inequality (Gini coefficients) as a between-level variable 
moderating the association between Symbolic Prejudice and wellbeing, and 
moderating the interaction between Symbolic Prejudice and ethnicity (i.e. a three-
way, cross-level interaction). Gini coefficients and the population sizes of area units 
were centred at their respective grand means. Population size was divided by 1000 
such that each unit of the variable represents 1000 individuals. Descriptive statistics 
and correlations between all variables at Level 1 are presented in Table 1.  
In line with Hypothesis 1, between-level analyses indicated that regional 
inequality was negatively associated with personal wellbeing. Further, in support of 
Hypothesis 2, Symbolic Prejudice was positively associated with personal wellbeing. 
At the within-level of analysis, household income (log), age and education were also 
positively associated with wellbeing. Men reported significantly higher wellbeing 
than women, and Europeans reported significantly higher wellbeing than Māori. 
However, the interaction between ethnicity and Symbolic Prejudice was non-
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significant. Thus, the palliative effect of Symbolic Prejudice appears to be similar in 
magnitude across members of low- or high-status groups.  
 At the between-level of analysis, area-unit population was not significantly 
related to wellbeing. Crucially, consistent with Hypotheses 3, there was a significant 
cross-level interaction between Symbolic Prejudice and regional inequality predicting 
wellbeing (See Table 2 for the full set of regression coefficients). However, the three-
way interaction between inequality, Symbolic Prejudice and ethnicity was non-
significant. This indicated that the way in which the strengths of the palliative effects 
of Symbolic Prejudice varied as a function of contextual inequality was similar for 
members of both low- and high-status groups.  
To probe the interaction between Symbolic Prejudice and regional inequality, 
we estimated simple slopes for the effect of Symbolic Prejudice at conditional Gini 
values of .47 (the grand mean), .42 (.05 below the mean) and .57 (.10 above the 
mean). We opted for these lower and upper values because the distribution of Gini 
coefficients was skewed, and these values represented the lower and upper decile 
values (i.e., the 10th and 90th percentile points) of our measure of inequality.  
As shown in Figure 1, Symbolic Prejudice was most strongly positively 
associated with personal wellbeing at high conditional values of inequality (b = .170, 
se = .034, z = 5.07, p < .001, 95% CI [.104, .236]). The simple slope for the effect of 
Symbolic Prejudice on wellbeing at moderate conditional values of inequality was 
also significant, but smaller in magnitude (b = .124, se = .020, z = 6.156, p < .001, 
95% CI [.085, .164]) while the simple slope at low conditional values of inequality 
was the smallest in size (b = .080, se = .026, z = 3.040, p = .002, 95% CI [.028, 
.130]). Thus, in line with Hypothesis 3, the greater in contextual inequality the 




 This is the first study of its kind testing the palliative effects of Symbolic 
Prejudice, and testing how these effects differ between advantaged and disadvantaged 
groups, as well as between those living in more versus less equal conditions. First, we 
found that people who lived in more unequal neighbourhoods reported lower 
wellbeing, on average, than those who lived in more equal neighbourhoods. This is 
consistent with prior work showing that inequality is negatively associated with 
wellbeing, especially in Western nations (Alesina et al., 2004; Oishi et al., 2011; 
Osborne, Sibley & Sengupta, 2015).   
Second, we found a positive association between Symbolic Prejudice and 
wellbeing. This finding is consistent with the notion that ideologies that legitimise 
inequality have psychological benefits for those who subscribe to them (e.g., Napier 
& Host, 2008; Wakslak et al., 2007). It also extends this literature on palliative effects 
by showing that Symbolic Prejudice, which legitimises inequality by framing certain 
groups as undeserving has similar psychological consequences as ideologies that 
frame certain individuals as undeserving (e.g. Meritocracy, PWE). Moreover, given 
that the content of Symbolic Prejudice is specific to the nature of group-based 
disadvantage, our results add greater support to inequality-legitimation account of 
palliative effects. While it is quite possible that generalised Conservatism has 
palliative effects because it is associated with other factors that predict positive 
adjustment (as argued by Schlenker et al., 2011), or because it reflects higher status 
which gives people access to a larger number of social identities (as argued by Jetten 
et al., 2013), these explanations cannot as easily account for the palliative effects of 
Symbolic Prejudice.  
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Third, we found that contextual inequality moderated the relationship between 
Symbolic Prejudice and wellbeing. More specifically, the positive association 
between Symbolic Prejudice and wellbeing was stronger for people living in more 
unequal neighbourhoods. This supports our argument that subscribing to legitimising 
ideologies can help assuage the discomfort triggered by inequality. People might 
generally have an awareness that inequalities exist in their societies and therefore 
legitimising ideologies serve a palliative function for everyone (hence the main effect 
of Symbolic Prejudice on wellbeing). However, those living in more unequal 
neighbourhoods are directly confronted with the reality of inequality, making it more 
salient, thereby increasing the hedonic ‘pay-off’ of ideologically legitimising it. This 
pattern of results adds further weight to the idea that the reason why ideology exerts 
palliative effects is because certain belief systems help people cope with the 
inequality they are exposed to.  
Finally, we did not find any ethnic-group differences in the strength of the 
palliative effects of Symbolic Prejudice. We tested for these differences because of 
conflicting indications in the literature that they might either be stronger or weaker 
among low-status groups compared to high-status groups. However, the fact that these 
effects are similar in size for members of both kinds of groups is informative in itself. 
Despite the fact that the content of Symbolic Prejudice runs directly counter to the 
group interests of Maori (by suggesting that Maori do not need any systematic 
compensation for historical injustices they have suffered), they seemed to gain a 
similar degree of palliation from this ideology as the group that benefits materially 
from it (i.e. Europeans).  
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This has negative implications for the prospects of social changes towards 
equality. This kind of social change most often occurs through the political 
mobilisation of members of historically disadvantaged groups (e.g. see Reicher, 
2007). In order for these groups to become mobilised, they need to feel a sense of 
injustice, anger and moral outrage over the unfairness their group is subjected to (van 
Zomeren, Spears, Fischer & Leach, 2004). However, if they subscribe to belief 
systems that soften the blow of inequality, they might be less likely to find the 
political will to engage in the difficult actions required to improve their group’s 
position. This is the central point of Marx’s opium metaphor – certain beliefs can 
sedate those who are living in conditions that they would otherwise be motivated to 
rebel against. This is why when he advocates criticising these sedative belief systems 
he does so in the hope that people will shake off their comforting illusions, and create 
the kind of reality in which they do not need to use false beliefs as a coping 
mechanism: 
“Criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers on the chain not in order that man 
shall continue to bear that chain without fantasy or consolation, but so that he 
shall throw off the chain and pluck the living flower” (Marx, 1844).  
Strengths and Limitations 
 It must be acknowledged that the cross-sectional data in this study does not 
allow for a definitive test of the causal direction of the ideology-wellbeing 
relationship. For example, it could be that people with greater wellbeing are apt to 
endorse Symbolic Prejudice (see Schlenker, Chambers, & Le, 2012 for a similar 
argument relating to the ideology of generalised conservatism). However, the 
interaction we found between inequality and ideology would be harder to explain 
from this perspective. We do not readily see why subjective wellbeing should increase 
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Symbolic Prejudice more strongly among those who live in relatively unequal areas 
than among those who live in relatively equal areas. Nonetheless, future research 
using experimental and longitudinal designs will be able to speak more definitively to 
the causal direction hypothesised here.  
Another limitation of our analysis is that we have operationalised regional 
inequality in terms of income, whereas group status and ideology were 
operationalised in terms of ethnicity. Ideally, we would have attempted to show that 
those living in areas with the greatest ethnic inequality gained the most palliative 
benefits from an ideology that legitimises the inequality that exists along ethnic-group 
lines. However, we were unable to construct a measure of ethnic inequality, for want 
of regional-level data on the income distribution across ethnic-groups. 
 Nonetheless, there are at least two reasons why we think our ability to draw 
conclusions about the effects of inequality might not be substantively mitigated by 
this lack of alignment. First, our argument about inequality is essentially an argument 
about how exposure to social stratification makes societal unfairness salient. 
Therefore, the actual dimension along which that stratification exists is not 
particularly important for the case we are trying to make. As long as inequality 
triggers concerns about the fairness of status differences between groups (see 
Johnson, Leedom & Muhtadie, 2012; Oishi et al., 2011), it should affect people in the 
way we hypothesise. Consistent with this idea, research in New Zealand has shown 
that exposure income inequality does in fact correlate positively with perceptions of 
ethnic-group-based relative deprivation (Osborne, Sibley & Sengupta, 2015). 
Second, as in other postcolonial nations, income and ethnic inequality are 
strongly linked in New Zealand. For example, according to (admittedly older) 
available census data, Māori make up 14.9% of the New Zealand population but 
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account for 38.5% of the lowest household-income quartile and only 12.5% of the 
highest quartile (Statistics New Zealand, 1996). More recent data show that the 
proportion of Māori living below the poverty line (60% of the median household 
income) is twice that of Europeans (34% and 17% respectively; The Social Report, 
2014). Further, while incomes among Europeans have increased slightly since 2008, 
incomes among Māori have dropped sharply (Statistics New Zealand, 2012). This 
high degree of alignment between ethnic-group and income-inequality in New 
Zealand means that when New Zealanders see inequality around them, they are apt to 
interpret in within the context of the clear socio-economic divide that exists along 
ethnic-group lines. Therefore, it is not difficult to see how people living under greater 
income inequality might gain a palliative benefit from an ideology that legitimises 
ethnic-group inequality. 
A major strength of our study is its use of large representative samples of both 
high- and low-status groups, as well as the high number of area units representing 
abutting regions of New Zealand. The use of a regional-level index of inequality has 
several advantages over previous analyses in the SJT literature, which have 
investigated the moderating effects of inequality by using indices of cross-national 
variation in inequality (e.g. Brandt, 2013; Napier et al., 2010).  
First, countries differ on many characteristics other than their levels of 
inequality, and therefore, tests of the effects of cross-national inequality cannot easily 
rule out third-variable accounts for the same phenomena (Oishi et al., 2011). Second, 
the large number of Level 2 units (i.e., neighbourhoods) in our analysis (N = 1437) 
meant that we had much higher statistical power to test cross-level interactions than 
previous analyses which have had to rely on between 30 and 65 Level 2 units (i.e., 
nations; e.g. Naiper & Jost, 2010). Third, if we are correct, people’s responses to 
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inequality should not only depend on the overall level of inequality in their nation, but 
also on the information they get about the inequality in their society from their 
immediate context. Indeed, people are generally incapable of accurately judging the 
overall level of inequality in their nation (Norton & Ariely, 2011), but their subjective 
perceptions of disadvantage are closely calibrated to the level of inequality in their 
neighbourhood context (Osborne et al., 2015). Therefore, it becomes important to 
measure variation in exposure to inequality in people’s immediate environment. 
 
Conclusion 
 Our results indicate that people living in conditions of inequality feel better 
about their situation if they are able to ideologically legitimise the group-based 
hierarchy which characterises their society. This implies that ideology is not just a 
mechanism to perpetuate inequality, but also a coping mechanism to deal with 
entrenched inequality. This dual function of ideology can make unequal systems very 
resistant to change, since those who have the greatest interest in overturning the status 
quo – those who suffer under the most inequality – also gain the most psychological 
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Figure 1. Line graph showing the relationship between Symbolic Prejudice and 




















Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations between all variables at Level 1.  	 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Age       -       
2. Gender .09*       -      
3. Education -.15* -.09*       -     
4. Income (log) -.18 * .05* .30*       -        
5. Ethnicity -.13* -.01 -.15* -.11*       -       
6. Symbolic Prejudice .07* .09* -.20* -.02 -.24*       -       
7. Personal Wellbeing .07* -.03* .11* .25* -.15* .08*     -   
M 47.97 .40 -.36 11.08 .19 5.14 6.59 
SD 15.78 .49 1.30 .78 .40 1.43 1.81 
















Table 2. Regression coefficients for the multi-level model predicting personal wellbeing  
 
 




 b se 95% CI z p 
   low high   
Intercept 6.605 .029 6.549 6.662   
Age .011 .002 .008 .015 6.175 .000 
Gender -.157 .052 -.259 -.055 -3.023 .003 
Education .102 .022 .059 .145 4.663 .000 
Income(log) .589 .048 .494 .684 12.188 .000 
Area population .000 .017 -.033 .033 -.010 .992 
Ethnicity -.332 .077 -.482 -.182 -4.332 .000 
Symbolic Prejudice  .124 .020 .085 .164 6.156 .000 
Regional inequality -3.770 .592 -4.930 -2.610 -6.370 .000 
Symbolic Prejudice x Ethnicity .082 .057 -.030 .194 1.435 .151 
Inequality x Ethnicity -.357 1.854 -3.991 3.277 -.193 .847 
Inequality x Symbolic Prejudice .912 .443 .044 1.780 2.059 .040 
Inequality x Symbolic Prejudice x Ethnicity 2.902 1.516 -.069 5.874 1.915 .056 
Note. N = 5,592 participants, N = 1,432 regions, average cluster size = 3.905, ICC for outcome = .038, loglikelihood = -11037, AIC = 
22110, BIC = 22229. 
 
